This paper studies intertemporal choice in a dynamic framework with 
Despite its long history and central place in economics, a preference foundation for the integral form of exponential discounting in continuous time was only recently obtained by Kopylov (2010) . 1 As a special case of CQH discounting, this paper extends Kopylov's static preference foundation to a dynamic framework, providing, to the best of my knowledge, the first foundation for exponential dis- The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the notation used in the paper, Section 3 presents the model formally, Section 4 covers the basic axioms, Section 5 characterises the class of time invariant, additively and multiplicatively separable representations, Section 6 characterises exponential discounting, and Section 7 formulates the two-stage consistency axiom and characterises continuous quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In Section 8 a preference condition capturing present bias is formulated and characterised under CQH discounting. All proofs are in the appendix.
Definitions
Let be a set of outcomes and let time be = [0, ∞). The present, denoted , is the time at which a decision maker makes a decision. Denote by the interval 1 As noted by Harvey and Osterdal (2012:285) , it is "surprising that integral discounting models
were not developed long ago -and many readers may assume that they have been."
[ , ∞). Let  denote the set of consumption streams, the set of step functions ∶ → . That is, functions that are constant on intervals [ −1 , ) for some = 0 < 1 < ⋯ < −1 < = ∞. Typical elements of  are , , . A consumption stream is a constant stream if, for all , ∈ , ( ) = ( ). The set of constant streams is  * . For consumption streams , ∈  and ⩽ ⩽ , the notation [ , ) is used to denote the consumption stream with outcome ( ) for all ∈ [ , ) and outcome ( ) for all ∉ [ , ).
At each , the decision maker chooses so as to maximise their static, present preference relation ≿ ⊆  ×  . For , ∈  , interpret ≽ as "stream is not preferred to stream at decision time ." If , ∈  0 , ≽ means that | ≽ | , where | and | are the respective restrictions of and to . Preferences for outcomes are derived from preferences for constant streams. That is, for , ∈  write ( ) ≽ ( ) if the constant stream̃ ∈  * always equal to outcome ( ) is not preferred to the constant stream̃ ∈  * always equal to outcome ( ).
A dynamic preference structure is a collection of static preference relations  = {≿ } ∈ . A dynamic model  = { } ∈ is a collection of real-valued functions ∶  → ℝ. A dynamic preference structure  is represented by a dynamic model  if for each ≿ ∈  there is a ∈  such that, for all , ∈  , ≿ if and only if ( ) ⩾ ( ).
Invariant separable discounting holds if  is represented by a dynamic model  such that, for all ∈ :
with ∶ → ℝ a ≿ -increasing utility function for outcomes, and ∶ → ℝ a strictly decreasing and continuous discount function, with (0) = 1 and lim →∞ ( − ) = 0. Exponential discounting holds if ℛ is represented by a dynamic model such that, for all ∈ :
with ∶ → ℝ a ≽ -increasing utility function for outcomes, and ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor.
Continuous Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
In certain applications, time is taken to be discrete. For example taking = {0, 1, 2, …}. Instead of consumption streams, the objects of choice in the discrete time framework are called consumption sequences. A sequence gives outcome ( ) at time ∈ {0, 1, 2, …}. Discrete quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds if ℛ, restricted to sequences of outcomes, is represented by such that, for all ∈ :
with ∶ → ℝ a ≽ -increasing utility function for outcomes, ∈ (0, 1) the discount factor, and > 0 the penalty factor. If < 1, then outcomes occuring after the immediate present are penalised an amount in addition to the discount factor, thus capturing present-biased preferences. This section considers the extension of discrete quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time.
Discrete quasi-hyperbolic discounting corresponds to invariant separable discounting with a discount function which, at times − = 0, 1, 2, …, gives 1, , 2 , ….
One discount function in continuous time that agrees with discrete quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and has also been called the quasi-hyperbolic discount function, is the following:
with 0 ⩽ ⩽ 1 and 0 ⩽ ⩽ 1. Harris and Laibson (2013) referred to invariant separable discounting with discount function (1) as the instantaneous gratification model. It arises as a limiting case of the following discount function:
with 0 ⩽ ⩽ 1, 0 ⩽ ⩽ 1, and 0 < < ∞. Under this discount function, delays shorter than and longer than are discounted by the factor same , but the penalty term is applied only to longer delays. Discount function (1) 
with 0 < < ∞, 0 ⩽ ⩽ 1, and 0 ⩽ ⩽ 1 . The present, instead of being a single point , is an interval [ , ] , where is a subjective parameter, the switch point, that delineates the present from the future. Delays shorter than are discounted exponentially using the discount factor ( 1 ), and delays longer than are weighted by a penalty factor and discounted exponentially using the discount factor . Discount function (3) is continuous everywhere, in particular:
If ∈ (0, 1), then the above discount function at times − = 0, 1, 2, … gives 
utility function for outcomes. Exponential discounting is the special case of CQH discounting with = 1. CQH discounting retains the intuitive properties of discrete quasi-hyperbolic discounting, in a form more convenient for continuous time applications. The main theorem of this paper, presented in Section 7, provides a dynamic preference foundation for CQH discounting over consumption streams.
Under CQH discounting, the switch point is a subjective parameter, expressed in terms of delay from the decision time. For example, if the switch point is one month from the decision time, then utility in six months is discounted using the penalty factor and discount factor . Five and half months later, utility at the same point in calendar time would be less than one month from the decision time.
At this decision time, the same utility would be classed as "in the present" and discounted using the, possibly different, discount factor ( 1 ). In this way, CQH discounting is able to account for the typical change their plans associated with procrastination. CQH discounting, in general, allows for decreasing or increasing impatience. In section 8 a preference condition for decreasing impatience leading to present bias is formulated which, under CQH discounting, is equivalent to ⩽ 1.
CQH discounting (3) and Harris and Laibson's discount function (2) both belong to the general class of semi-hyperbolic discount functions, characterised by Olea and Strzalecki (2014):
with strictly decreasing everywhere. Semi-hyperbolic discounting does not constrain the discount function for delays shorter than , then takes the exponential form for all longer delays. Note that, in their axiomatisation of (5), Olea and Strzalecki (2014) assumed as a primitive. In the preference foundation for CQH discounting, is derived endogenously from preferences.
Basic Axioms
The following five axioms are assumed:
Axiom 1 (Weak Ordering):
For all ≿ ∈ , ≿ over  is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Common Outcome Independence):
For all ≿ ∈ , , , ,̃ ∈  , and ⩽ :
Axiom 4 (Weak outcome separability):
For all ≿ ∈ , ⩽ , ⩽ , and all
Axiom 5 (Strong Monotone Continuity):
For all ≿ ∈ , ∈  * , , ∈  , and
with
[ , ) either empty or a single
Weak ordering is necessary for a dynamic preference structure  to admit a dynamic model representation . Common outcome independence, formally equivalent to axiom P2 of Savage (1954) , is necessary for additive separability of each ∈ . Interval monotonicity is a standard monotonicity assumption, except that strict preference is required when one stream dominates another and strictly dominates on a non-degenerate interval. Weak outcome separability, formally equivalent to axiom P4 of Savage (1954) , is necessary for multiplicative separability of time discounting from outcome utility. Strong monotone continuity, introduced by Kopylov (2010) , adapts the monotone continuity axioms used by Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1970) .
Time Invariance
Given a consumption stream ∈  0 and ∈ , denote by the stream ∈  such that ( ) = ( − ) for all ∈ . Although a stream ∈  0 and the stream are different objects, there is a particular lens through which they appear 
Time Consistency
An invariant separable discounter will, inevitably, repeat the same behaviour with each new decision time. Suppose that, today, such a decision maker plans to start saving in six months time. Then, six months later, the decision maker will again prefer to wait six months to start saving. The decision maker procrastinates. In terms of observed behaviour, the decision maker appears consistent; repeating the same pattern of not saving each day. However, there is an inconsistency if one compares observed with planned behaviour. Time consistency refers to consistency of planned behaviour with observed behaviour. In this section, a preference-based definition of time consistency is formulated.
Consider the streams and in Figure 1 . Choosing stream over will involve a period of increased consumption followed a period of decreased consumption.
Suppose that, at time zero, the decision maker prefers to . Clearly, if the decision is reconsidered at time + , the beneficial part of has passed, and the decision maker would do well to choose , regardless of their preference at earlier times.
Before time , however, the differences between and are yet to materialise.
Reversing one's earlier preference at any of those times is the behaviour ruled out by the following axiom: The proof of Theorem 6.1 will follow as a corollary of the paper's main theorem, presented in the next section. Note that a similar theorem, in the timed outcome framework, has been obtained by Halevy (2015) .
Consider again Figure 1 . Suppose that, at time zero, a continuous quasi-hyperbolic (CQH) discounter prefers to . When considered at time zero, the relative costs and benefits of choosing occur more than time units from the decision time, hence they are evaluated using the same discount factor. At time , the preference may be different. The relative costs of choosing occur after + and can, therefore, be discounted differently than the relative benefits of , which occur almost immediately after . The possibility of reversing one's preference arises, therefore CQH discounters can violate of time consistency.
Complementary Time Consistency
Since Thaler (1980) , there has been a great deal of evidence to suggest that decision makers' preferences often exhibit present bias. For example, decision makers who today prefer £120 in 13 months to £100 in 12 months, will often prefer £100 today to £120 in one month. In both cases the decision maker must wait one month for an additional £20. Such a delay is considered acceptable, if it occurs in the future, but is disliked when money is immediately available.
If time invariance is assumed, present bias preferences lead to violations of time consistency. Under time invariance, the initial preference for £100 today over £120
in one month means that the initial preference for £120 in 13 months over £100 in 12 months will be reversed if the choice is reconsidered in 12 months. CQH discounting preferences are compatible with present bias, and its converse future bias, hence can violate time consistency. We use the term present affected to mean either present bias or future bias. This section considers how the time consistency axiom can be relaxed to allow for present affected preferences. Furthermore, we allow the terms "present" and "after the present" to be subjectively defined.
Present affected preferences manifest themselves only when comparing delays in the present with delays after the present. Allowing for present affected preferences does not, therefore, require that the time consistency axiom is amended for decisions involving streams that differ only in the sufficiently remote future. To formalise this, consider the following: Provided that two streams do not differ before time , a dynamic preference structure  that satisfying the above condition behaves consistently. Such a condition seems reasonable when is far enough in the future to be considered "after the present". 3 Consider also the following analogous condition: The above condition seems reasonable when is sufficiently close to the decision time, such that the streams above differ only in the "present".
We can now formulate our axiom, complementary time consistency. To focus on present effects alone, we consider preferences that may be present affected, but are otherwise time consistent. In this case, a violation of time-consistency-within--from-now occurs only when the time interval from now to contains both the "present" period and an "after the present" period. Then, it must be that the time interval after contains only "after the present" times. As such, whenever timeconsistency-within--from-now is violated, we must exclude violations of timeconsistency-beyond--from-now. Analogously, a violation of time-consistencybeyond--from-now occurs only when the time interval after contains part of the "present" period and an "after the present" period. In this case, the time interval before must contain only "present" times, hence we must exclude violations of time-consistency-within--from-now. This is summarised in the following axiom:
Axiom 7* (Complementary Time Consistency):
For all ∈ ,  satisfies at least one of time-consistency-within--from-now or time-consistency-beyond--from-now.
To understand why complementary time consistency is necessary for CQH discounting, first consider the following:
Lemma 7.3. Continuous quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds, with switch point , only if  satisfies time-consistency-within--from-now and time-consistencybeyond--from-now.
Suppose that, at a given time , we observe a CQH discounter violate time-consistencywithin--from-now. From such an observation, we may infer that the switch point has been crossed, hence < . The complementary condition, time-consistencybeyond--from-now, then must hold. A violation of the latter condition would imply > , which has been ruled out. Conversely, an observed violation of time-consistency-beyond--from-now must entail that the complementary condition, time-consistency-within--from-now, holds. Hence, complementary time consistency is necessary for CQH discounting.
In certain circumstances, there may be a natural candidate for the switch point.
In such cases, it may be reasonable to take as a primitive, and postulate timeconsistency-within--from-now and time-consistency-beyond--from-now as axioms. This would deliver CQH discounting. In general, however, it is desirable to derive the switch point from preferences. It will be shown that the complementary time consistency axiom delivers, from preferences, both the switch point and the consistency properties associated with the derived switch point. The main theorem of this paper can now be stated: 
Subjective Present Bias
In the previous section, we defined present affected preferences as preferences exhibiting either present bias or future bias. There is evidence supporting both types of bias, and CQH discounting is compatible with either type, but the overwhelming majority of present affected decision makers seem to be present biased. It is, therefore, interesting to characterise the class of CQH discounters exhibiting present bias. This corresponds to the case where delays after the present seem to be penalised less severely than delays in the present. Under CQH discounting, this requires that the initial discount factor ( 1 ) is less than the future discount factor , which is equivalent to < 1. In this section, a preference axiom is formulated called subjective present bias that characterises this condition under CQH discounting. 4 Recall the following axiom, formulated in this framework by Kopylov (2010) :
Under exponential discounting, utility is discounted by a constant factor over time.
The stationarity axiom, which is necessary for exponential discounting, expresses this constant level of impatience as a preference condition. When comparing streams that differ on intervals [ , ) and [ , ), stationarity asserts that indifferences are not upset when these intervals are delayed by a common delay > 0. If stationarity is assumed, CQH discounting reduces to exponential discounting.
Present bias is a direct violation of the stationarity axiom. In this paper, we allow the period called the "present" to be subjectively defined. Our definition of "present" is, essentially, the period that a present-biased decision maker is biased towards. 5 To operationalise this idea, suppose that a violation of stationarity is observed:
If present bias is driving the above violation of stationarity, it cannot be that the outcome in each stream occurs only in the present. Hence, the present period must end no later than time + . Similarly, it cannot be that the outcome in each stream above occurs only after the present, hence the present period must not end before the earliest time . The above preferences, therefore, suggest that the threshold ending the present period lies in the interval [ , + ].
Suppose that we also observe the indifference:
Having established that, for this decision maker, the threshold ending the present period lies in the interval [ , + ], it is apparent that the interval [̃ ,̃ ) occurs entirely in the present and the interval [̃ ,̃ ) occurs entirely after the present. If a delay > 0 is now introduced, with̃ + < so that this separation remains, then the decision maker is comparing a delay in the present with a delay after the present. For present biased preferences, the delay after the present is penalised less severely, hence one expects:
This is formulated as an axiom: The proof of Proposition 8.1 is presented in Appendix A.4.
Discussion
The choice of the dynamic framework in this paper warrants explanation. Instead of positing a static preference relation, a preference relation at each point in time was assumed. The key axioms, time invariance, time consistency and complementary time consistency, are dynamic axioms. They do not constrain preferences at a single point in time, but instead constrain how preferences change (or do not change) over time. 6 An advantage of the framework used here is that it highlights the especially attractive features of exponential discounting, and precisely how CQH discounting deviates. Compare the requirements of stationarity (one's instantaneous preferences are invariant under translations that preserve relative delays) with time consistency (one should not reverse one's preferences for what are, in an absolute sense, the same objects) and time invariance (one should not reverse one's preferences for what are, in a relative sense, the same objects). The latter conditions are more suggestive of prescriptive principles to guide economic agents, because avoiding preference reversals for the same objects provides a degree of immunity against economic ruin. Although Samuelson (1937) did not endorse exponential discounting as a normative model, he noted time consistency as an appealing property. 7 In the context of choice under risk, Machina (1989; 1685) argued that dynamic arguments prescribing expected utility were more "formidable" than those referring to static decisions. Those arguments also apply to choice over time with little translation.
It is not clear how to formulate preference axioms for invariant separable discounting assuming discount function (2) . For CQH discounting, a falsifiable axiom has been formulated such that the switch point, where the discount factor changes, arises endogeneously from preferences. Under discount function (2), however, the switch point corresponds to a discontinuity. Such preferences, therefore, do not satisfy the strong monotone continuity axiom. Continuity axioms, in general, are not falsfiable. They are technical axioms, in the sense that either existential qualifiers or infinite sequences are used. Adapting the continuity axiom to allow for a discontinuity at a point determined engoneously by preferences could be possible. However, is not clear how to provide an axiom set that cleanly separates the behavioural from the technical in the way that Theorem 7.4 does for CQH discounting. Also note that, while it may be possible to adapt the techniques here to derive the continuous class of semi-hyperbolic discount functions (5), allowing the switch point to arise endogenously from preferences, this problem also remains open. 7 He writes, "The particular results we have reached are not subject to criticism on this score, having been carefully selected to take care of this provision. Contemplation of our particular equations will reveal that the results are unchanged even if the individual always discounts from the existing point of time rather than from the beginning of the period" (Samuelson, 1937; 160) .
In this paper, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which is popular for discrete time ap- (2015) could be adapted for such a purpose. As with the discrete case, I expect that continuous quasi-hyperbolic discounting is at best an approximation to more realistic behaviour, but remains useful for other reasons. The main appeal of this model is its tractability, and this will manifest in future theoretical applications.
given ⩽ ⩽ ⩽ , is equivalent to: to both sides yields:
The above expression is equivalent to [ , ) ≿ [ , ) , as required.
It is now shown time-consistency-beyond--from-now holds. The first preference
, given ⩽ ⩽ ⩽ , is equivalent to:
which holds if and only if ∫ − ( ( )) ⩾ ∫ − ( ( )) . Multiplying both sides by , then adding
22 to both sides yields:
The above expression is equivalent to [ , ) ≿ 0 [ , ) , as required. □
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1
The sufficiency of the axioms for invariant separable discounting is established.
The necessity of the axioms involves only simple substitutions. Consider timezero preferences ≿ 0 ∈ . Axioms 1-5 imply, by Corollary 3 of Kopylov (2010) , that ≿ 0 over  0 is represented by the following map:
where ∶ → ℝ is a ≿ 0 -increasing utility for outcomes, and is a countably additive measure with ([0, ∞)) = 1 and ( ) = 0 for all ∈ . In this representation, is unique and is cardinal.
For all < , and , ∈  * 0 with ≻ , the interval monotonicity axiom A3 Rearranging and dividing by ( ) − ( ) > 0 gives:
By axiom 8*, the above indifference holds only if, for > 0 such that̃ + < , we have [̃ + ,̃ + ) ≺ 0 [̃ + ,̃ + ) . Substituting CQH discounting and cancelling common terms as above yields:
Taken together, equation 6 and inequality 7 hold only if:
Because 0 < < ∞, it follows that < 1. □
